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Abstract Reasoning by exclusion, i.e. the ability to
understand that if there are only two possibilities and if it is
not A, it must be B, has been a topic of great interest in
recent comparative cognition research. Many studies have
investigated this ability, employing different methods, but
rarely exploring concurrent decision processes underlying
choice behaviour of non-human animals encountering
inconsistent or incomplete information. Here, we employed
a novel training and test method in order to perform an in-
depth analysis of the underlying processes. Importantly, to
discourage the explorative behaviour of the kea, a highly
neophilic species, the training included a large amount of
novel, unrewarded stimuli. The subsequent test consisted of
30 sessions with different sequences of four test trials. In
these test trials, we confronted the kea with novel stimuli
that were paired with either the rewarded or unrewarded
training stimuli or with the novel stimuli of previous test
trials. Once habituated to novelty, eight out of fourteen kea
tested responded to novel stimuli by inferring their con-
tingency via logical exclusion of the alternative. One
individual inferred predominantly in this way, while other
response strategies, such as one trial learning, stimulus
preferences and avoiding the negative stimulus also guided
the responses of the remaining individuals. Interestingly,
the difficulty of the task had no influence on the test per-
formance. We discuss the implications of these findings for
the current hypotheses about the emergence of inferential
reasoning in some avian species, considering causal links
to brain size, feeding ecology and social complexity.
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Introduction
The field of cognition research attempts to unravel the
mechanisms underlying the adaptive modification of
behaviour through individual or social learning. A topic of
great interest within comparative cognition is whether non-
human animals are able to solve novel problems in a quick
and beneficial way despite having incomplete information.
One form of dealing with uncertainty when facing novel
situations is to reason about known instances and logically
exclude alternatives (Call 2006). The common approach to
investigating such cognitive abilities is to devise tasks that,
by systematically excluding alternative explanations, allow
us to conclude if a certain ability is present or not (e.g. Call
2006; Aust et al. 2008; Schloegl et al. 2009a, b; Mikolasch
et al. 2012; Shaw et al. 2013; Jelbert et al. 2015). However,
behaviours other than the one of interest are rarely con-
sidered and often dismissed as not noteworthy, thus cre-
ating a very binary ‘all or nothing’ approach to the mental
capacities of animals.
An earlier experimental design by Aust et al. (2008)
already successfully investigated exclusion skills in
pigeons (Columba livia), dogs (Canis lupus familiaris) and
humans using a touch screen apparatus. The benefits of
using such a touch screen to present abstract tasks include
efficient data collection, reduction of biases through cues
given by the experimenter and applicability to a large
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variety of different species (e.g. Steurer et al. 2012).
However, while the experimental design of Aust et al.
(2008) controlled for responses based on neophilia, it was
not intended to test for inference by exclusion in neophilic
species. A recent study of O’Hara et al. (2015a) adapted the
design of Aust et al. (2008) to overcome previous limita-
tions with respect to neophilia and shift the focus from an
‘all or nothing’ approach to a more holistic analysis of
choice behaviour. This was achieved by implementing a
test procedure, which considered all possible response
patterns and attributed these to the simplest cognitive
processes underlying choice behaviour (henceforth referred
to as response strategies). Additional habituation to novelty
during the training proved effective at controlling for
neophilic responses of very investigative species such as
the Goffin cockatoo (Cacatua goffiniana). Not only could
the authors show, with this set-up, that Goffins were able to
base choices on inference by exclusion, but also highlight
the importance of other response strategies.
The kea (Nestor notabilis) is a parrot species endemic to
the alpine and subalpine regions of the South Island of New
Zealand. Sub-adult individuals form flocks of up to 20
individuals, whereas adults pair for life, forming family
groups and joining larger groups occasionally at foraging
sites (Clarke 1970; Diamond and Bond 1999). Thus, the
kea’s social structure may be best described as fission–
fusion-like. Their climatically harsh environment and low
predatory risk are believed to have caused the kea’s
explorative and curious nature (Diamond and Bond 1999;
Huber and Gajdon 2006; Auersperg et al. 2011; O’Hara
et al. 2015b). It is this neophilia we suspect to have over-
shadowed exclusion skills in a previous attempt to compare
inferential abilities in ravens (Corvus corax) and kea
(Schloegl et al. 2009b). Schloegl and colleagues used a
foraging task, originally devised by Call and Carpenter
(2001), in which either straight or bent tubes were baited
with food items and presented simultaneously to the indi-
viduals. While ravens discarded empty, straight tubes that
were oriented towards them and thus provided visual
information of the presence or absence of food, kea
investigated empty tubes from both sides in approximately
a third of all trials before choosing the ‘correct’ tube. These
results led Schloegl et al. (2009a, b) to conclude that
competitiveness and food-storing behaviour may have
promoted the raven’s exclusion skills, while the feeding
ecology of the kea, an extractive forager (Brejaart 1988;
Diamond and Bond 1999), led to extensive search beha-
viour, which at a first glance seems inefficient sometimes
(O’Hara et al. 2012, 2015b; Gajdon et al. 2013; Greer et al.
2015). However, extractive foraging has been suggested to
also promote exclusion skills in primates (Bra¨uer et al.
2006; Paukner et al. 2009; Marsh et al. 2015), as it may
require individuals to infer the location of hidden food,
whereas others (e.g. Petit et al. 2015) have argued that
social complexity was the driving force for the ability to
infer by exclusion.
Neophilia, as the predisposition to explore novel objects
(Greenberg 2003), has been identified as an important
factor accounting for biased test results especially in kea
(O’Hara et al. 2012). Greenberg and Mettke-Hofmann
(2001) have established a two-factor model that allows for
predictions to be made based upon which ecological cir-
cumstances neophilia and exploration may be expected for
different species. They conclude that a complex environ-
ment and low predation risk promote neophilic tendencies.
Species inhabiting islands, such as the kea and Goffin
cockatoos, seem more prone to investigate novel items, as
on islands exploration may be very rewarding and at the
same time not very costly (Greenberg and Mettke-Hof-
mann 2001). One way to overcome such tendencies in
behavioural testing is to habituate individuals to novelty.
Once individuals have sufficiently explored and habituated
to a novel set-up they may exhibit cognitively more
demanding abilities (Gajdon et al. 2013).
Kea have been shown to be exceptional problem solvers
in the technical domain (Werdenich and Huber 2006;
Huber and Gajdon 2006; Auersperg et al. 2009, 2011) and
possess a large brain size compared to their body weight
(brain weight/body weight = 0.015; see Iwaniuk et al.
2005), comparable to that of ravens (brain weight/body
weight = 0.011; see Sol et al. 2010). Thus, corvids and
parrots constitute prime candidates for advanced cognitive
abilities among birds (Lefebvre et al. 2004; Iwaniuk et al.
2005; Roth and Dicke 2005). Therefore, we hypothesise
that neophilia overruled the capacity to reason by exclusion
rather than preclude such abilities in a previous study
(Schloegl et al. 2009b).
Exclusion skills in non-human animals may have dif-
ferent origins. Several corvid researchers have proposed
the emergence of exclusion skills in these birds as an
adaption to their specialised feeding ecology (Schloegl
et al. 2009b; Mikolasch et al. 2012), in support of the
adaptive specialisation hypothesis (Krebs 1990; de Kort
and Clayton 2006). Some primatologists, however, argued
that in primates these skills have emerged as an adaptation
to socially complex situations (Petit et al. 2015). Further,
Pepperberg et al. (2013) have suggested that these skills are
a fundamental cognitive ability and a marker of general
intelligence.
If we accept relative brain size (defined as size of cor-
tical or equivalent structures in relation to the overall brain
size) as a reasonable indicator of cognitive abilities, and
one marker of such to be the ability to reason based on
exclusion, as suggested by Pepperberg et al. (2013), we
would predict the kea to be capable of solving problems of
this nature, if confounding behavioural predispositions
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(e.g. neophilia) are controlled for. The alternative hypoth-
esis that exclusion abilities constitute an adaption to a
specialised feeding ecology of food-storing birds (Schloegl
et al. 2009a, b; Schloegl 2011; Mikolasch et al. 2012)
would predict this ability to be absent in the kea. Unless it
has evolved independently (at least twice) in birds, under
different evolutionary pressures, kea are not storing food
and are only distantly related to corvids.
Studies on exclusion performance in animals have also
discussed the effect of task difficulty on the ability to make
inferences (Grether and Maslow 1937; Marsh et al. 2015).
Therefore, in addition to the possible effects of neophilia
we investigated the effect of cognitive load (Sweller 1988)
on task performance. By modifying the original procedure
(O’Hara et al. 2015a), we introduced a group that received
the test trials in an alternative sequence, which should
result in a decrease in test trial spacing, thus benefiting the
working memory and could be considered computationally
less demanding (Barrouillet et al. 2007).
Materials and methods
Ethical statement
The Animal Ethics and Experimentation Board of the
Faculty of Life Sciences at the University of Vienna was
informed and approved this study (Reference number:
2015-006).
Test subjects
Fourteen kea of different ages (one juvenile, 1 year of age;
one sub-adult, 4 years of age; and twelve adults, mean age
9 ± 3 years) and sexes (nine males, five females) housed
in a large group aviary (approx. 520 m2) at the Haidlhof
Research Station near Vienna, Austria, participated in this
study (see Table 1). The group was fed three times per day
with vegetables, fruits, protein and seeds, and water was
available ad libitum. All individuals were familiar with the
touch screen and had participated in prior touch screen
tasks (O’Hara et al. 2015a).
Apparatus
We used an adapted version of the operant conditioning
system described in detail by Steurer et al. (2012). The
apparatus consisted of a touch-sensitive screen
(304 mm 9 228 mm display area, 381 mm diagonal,
1024 9 768 pixels), CPU and automatic rewarding system;
rewards were delivered centrally, 90 mm below the lower
edge of the screen. Individuals had easy access to the
screen and reward tray by standing on a platform
(400 9 700 mm), which was installed directly below the
reward tray. To avoid reflections of sunlight, wooden
panels were attached above and behind this platform,
nonetheless allowing the birds to retreat to the side at any
time. The program used for testing was ‘CognitionLab’
(version 1.9; see Steurer et al. 2012, for a detailed
description). An arbitrary collection of licence and
restriction-free clip arts, downloaded from the Open Clip
Art Library (http://www.openclipart.org/), was standard-
ised to generate images on white background, measuring
70 by 70 pixels, adapted for equal overall brightness, and
converted to Portable Network Graphic (png) files using
Fiji (ImageJ 1.49e, http://imagej.nih.gov/ij; ImageJ 2.0.0-
rc-9, http://developer.imagej.net/). Two stimuli were pre-
sented simultaneously within each trial, on the central
horizontal axis of the screen, 341 and 682 pixels, respec-
tively, away from the left side of the screen.
Procedure
The procedure followed the protocol of O’Hara et al.
(2015a), with two exceptions: thirty test sessions were
provided instead of 25, and testing was split into two
groups, with one group exactly following the procedure of
O’Hara et al. (2015a) and the second group only differing
in the sequence of test trials. We give a short summary of
the general procedure below and elaborate more on the
differences between the groups.
Table 1 Overview of individuals participating in this study
Individual Sex Age group Rearing Experience Group
Anu # Adult Hand No B
Coco $ Adult Hand No B
Elvira $ Adult Parent No A
Frowin # Adult Parent Yes B
John # Adult Parent Yes A
Kermit # Adult Hand Yes A
Lilly $ Adult Hand No A
Linus # Adult Hand Yes B
Papu $ Juvenile Hand No A
Paul # Sub-adult Parent No B
Pick # Adult Hand Yes B
Roku # Adult Parent No A
Sunny $ Adult Hand No A
Willy $ Adult Hand No B
Names of individuals participating in this experiment along with sex
(# for males, $ for females) and respective age group; rearing indi-
cates if individuals were hand raised or parent raised; experience
denotes whether or not individuals had participated in the previous
exclusion study by Schloegl et al. (2009a, b); group refers to exper-
imental group which each individual was assigned to
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Training
Each trial involved the simultaneous presentation of two
stimuli, of which one was rewarded (S?) and one was
unrewarded (S-). While touching the S? led to the
delivery of an eighth of a peanut seed, touching the S- led
to a 2-s timeout during which the screen went blank. Each
session consisted of 20 trials, 18 training (baseline) trials
and two randomly intermixed ‘novelty’ trials. For each
subject, we selected a different pair of images (S? and S-)
that would remain the same throughout all training trials. In
the novelty trials, the negative training stimulus was
replaced by a novel stimulus, being a different one in each
novelty trial. The stimuli were chosen and assigned ran-
domly to each individual from a pool of 190 possible icons.
The novelty trials were intended to habituate the kea to
novel stimuli and to reduce the neophilic tendencies to
explore a novel stimulus. However, this procedure was not
aimed at training inhibition towards novelty in general;
therefore, training did not continue until the subjects would
significantly choose the familiar stimulus over novel ones.
For this reason, we continued training until individuals
ceased to respond to both novel stimuli instead of choosing
the S? for two consecutive sessions (Criterion 1). To
ensure that the birds had learned the basic discrimination,
they were required to choose correctly in more than 80 %
(15/18) of the training trials for two consecutive sessions
(Criterion 2).
Testing
Once both criteria were met, 30 sessions of testing fol-
lowed. Each session included four test trials intermixed
within 16 training trials. In order to prevent a violation of
expectancy in test trials, stimuli with positive contingency
were rewarded (S?), whereas responses to stimuli with
negative contingency (S-) were immediately aborted (no
sound) and followed by the next training trial. Because this
differential rewarding of test stimuli could lead to absolute
stimulus learning, we used novel test stimuli for each test
session.
Test trials were presented consistently in a sequential
order. Test trial one consisted of a novel positive stimulus
(S ? 1), while the S- remained the same as in the training
trials. In test trial two, the S- was replaced with a novel
unrewarded stimulus (S - 1) and presented with the S? of
the training trials, while the test trial three offered a choice
of the novel rewarded stimulus of the test trial one (S ? 1)
and a completely novel unrewarded stimulus (S - 2). In
test trial four, the novel unrewarded stimulus of test trial
two (S - 1) was presented with a completely novel
rewarded stimulus (S ? 2). To investigate an effect of
cognitive load, the two groups A and B differed in the
sequence in which test trails were presented. Group A
received test trials one to four in an ordinal order resulting
in a test trial sequence: 1–2–3–4. Group B was presented
with test trial three before test trial two, resulting in a test
trial sequence of: 1–3–2–4 (see Fig. 1 for a schematic
outline of a test session and sequence for each group). This
resulted in corresponding test trials (test trials one and three,
respectively, two and four) to follow in consecutive
instances rather than intermixed, thus decreasing temporal
space between them along with the possibility to be
addressed sequentially rather than in parallel. The exact
position for each test trial within a session was determined
pseudo-randomly (trials 4 or 5 for the first test; trials 8 or 9
for the second test trial; trials 12 or 13 for the third test trial;
trials 16 or 17 for the fourth test trial), to ensure that at least
three training trials would be presented before the first test
trial and before the end of a session, as well as to provide at
least two training trials between each of the test trials.
Data analysis
‘Response strategies’ were defined by attributing each
possible response pattern the most parsimonious strategy
(O’Hara et al. 2015a):
An instance of ‘inference by exclusion’ was only con-
sidered, if correct stimuli were chosen in all four test trials
within a test session (see Fig. 1 for a graphic representa-
tion). These instances required individuals to either infer
the contingency of the novel stimulus in the first test trial or
simply avoid the S-. Further, in test trial three for group A
(test trial two for group B) they had to avoid the novel
stimulus (S - 2) and remain choosing the formerly
rewarded S ? 1. This is in principle the approach applied
by Aust et al. (2008), controlling for correct responses in
test trial one due to novelty preferences and simple
avoidance of S-. However, individuals may have formed
an association with the S ? 1 as a result of being rewarded,
which would qualify as one trial learning. Test trial two for
group A (test trial three for group B) and test trial four are
designed to control for such one trial learning. Here, the
individuals should refrain from a novel unrewarded stim-
ulus (S - 1) in test trial two for group A (test trial three for
group B) and choose the known rewarded stimulus. This
may be based on an avoidance of novelty, or simply a
strong positive association with S?. However, in this case
they have no direct information concerning the S - 1.
Therefore, choosing the S ? 2 in test trial four necessitates
individuals to avoid S - 1 based on an inference, hence
demonstrating the essence of inference by exclusion.
We assumed ‘one trial learning’ when individuals chose
the unrewarded stimulus solely in the fourth test trial, as
this indicates subjects fail to infer the contingency without
direct feedback. We also considered it ‘one trial learning’
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when the rewarded stimulus (S ? 2) was chosen in the
fourth test trial, after an initial response towards the novel
stimulus (S - 1) in the second test trial.
A further possible strategy may have been guided by
individuals transferring an acquired rule from the training
that novel stimuli are always unrewarded. Therefore, they
might avoid the novel S ? 1 in the first test trial. However,
if the subjects updated this rule and responded correctly in
the following test trials or even reversed this rule, hence
choosing the S - 1 instead of the original S? in the second
trial, we labelled this strategy ‘novelty rule abolishment/
reversal’.
‘Novelty aversion’ was considered as choosing the
stimulus which was more familiar to the kea, therefore
responding correctly in the first and fourth test trials, but
incorrectly in the second and third. ‘Novelty preferences’
were assumed if birds exhibited a reversed response pattern
in test trials, by responding correctly in the second and
third test trials, but incorrectly in the first and fourth test
trials.
Multiple patterns that exhibited consistently avoiding
rewarded stimuli or repeatedly choosing certain unre-
warded stimuli—or combinations of such behaviours—
were attributed to specific stimulus preferences or
avoidances.
Finally, incorrect choices in all four test trials eluded
any logical explanation on our part, which is why we
inferred it must have been a ‘bad day’ for the individual.
We employed two-tailed binomial testing with a
cumulative hypothesised probability (0.5 in test trial
one 9 0.5 in test trial two 9 0.5 in test trial three 9 0.5 in
test trial four) of success of p = 0.0625. Generalised linear
mixed effects models (GLMMs) with binomial error dis-
tribution and individual as a random factor were applied to
investigate the effect of group, sex and session (in order to
test whether certain strategies were acquired throughout the
Fig. 1 Schematic example of test trials and group-level results.
Schematic representation of test trials with exemplary stimuli, as well
as theoretical response predictions ordered with cognitively most
demanding on top; ? indicates rewarded stimuli; - indicates
unrewarded stimuli; 4 indicates correct; 7 indicates incorrect
choices, to the right percentage of response patterns employed at
group level; bold lines indicate median values; boxes are spanning
from the first to third quartiles; whiskers represent 95 % confidence
intervals; outliers are not included; the dotted line and grey area
indicate chance levels, while the solid line indicates significance as
calculated by two-tailed binomial test
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task) on the occurrence of response patterns exhibited
above chance on a group level. As our sample size for
young individuals is very low, we did not include age as a
factor in the analysis. Statistical analyses were conducted
in the R statistical package (R Development Core Team
2008), and for fitting models ‘lme4’ (Bates et al. 2014) was
used. Tests were two-tailed, and alpha was set to 0.05.
Results
Seven individuals learned the discrimination of the base-
line stimuli (Criterion 1: M = 3.7 sessions, ±0.43 SE)
before ceasing to respond to the novel stimuli (Criterion 2:
M = 6.1 sessions, ±0.70 SE, see Fig. 2). Five individuals
reached both criteria simultaneously (M = 7.4 sessions,
±2.99 SE), and two kea quit responding to novel stimuli
(M = 2 sessions, ±0.0 SE) before reaching the learning
criteria (M = 3 sessions, ±0.0 SE), yielding a result bor-
dering significance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p = 0.053,
r = -0.365) for learning the discrimination faster
(M = 4.9 sessions, ±1.14 SE) than refraining from
exploring novel stimuli (M = 6 sessions, ±1.15 SE).
On an individual level, we found eight individuals
exhibiting responses suggestive of reasoning by exclusion
significantly more often than expected by chance. Figure 3
displays the relative frequency with which each pattern was
employed for each individual and values within the bars
indicate the probability of this frequency occurring by
chance. However, patterns of reasoning by exclusion did
not occur as the sole strategy in seven of these eight
individuals, as also up to three other strategies occurred
above chance levels. Other strategies employed by most
animals were one trial learning, avoiding the unrewarded
baseline stimulus and stimulus preferences. Only one
individual (John) seemed to rely solely on reasoning by
exclusion. Individuals that did not exhibit reasoning by
exclusion patterns above chance levels chose by avoiding
novel stimuli, one trial learning and avoiding the S- in
addition to stimulus preferences.
On a group level, the GLMM confirmed a significant
intercept for occurrences of inferences based on exclusion
(GLMM: b = -1.686, SE = 0.12, V2(1) = 73.89,
p\ 0.001), but excluded any effects of group
(V2(1) = 0.55, p = 0.46), sex (V2(1) = 0.46, p = 0.497)
or session (V2(29) = 31.08, p = 0.36). Similarly, one of
the response patterns constituting one trial learning
(GLMM: b = -1.925, SE = 0.13, V2(1) = 34.87,
p\ 0.001), one pattern suggesting S- avoidance (GLMM:
b = -1.988, SE = 0.16, V2(1) = 19.79, p\ 0.001) and
preferences for S - 1 (GLMM: b = -1.783, SE = 0.12,
V2(1) = 55.49, p\ 0.001) occurred more often than pre-
dicted by chance on a group level (see Fig. 1). However,
none of the above-mentioned factors had a significant effect
on either of these strategies. When grouping only individ-
uals that successfully responded according to inferring by
exclusion and testing for frequencies of patterns, we found
that patterns for ‘inference by exclusion’ (M = 6.33,±0.57
SE) occurred significantly more often than patterns repre-
senting ‘one trial learning 1’ (M = 4.00, ±0.26 SE; Wil-
coxon signed-rank test: p = 0.034, r = -0.53).
Discussion
More than half of the subjects exhibited the ability to base
their choices on inference by exclusion. They achieved this
not only by considering direct feedback about a stimulus
Fig. 2 Performance in the training phase. a Learning curves for all
individuals over the sessions, with the dotted line indicating the
learning criterion of 80 % correct first choices (Criterion 1); longer
the lines indicate more sessions required to reach criterion; b cumu-
lative errors of novelty trials; a steep inclination of lines represents
novelty responses in both novelty trials moderate inclination response
to one novel stimulus per session and a straight horizontal line
indicating no responses towards novel the stimuli (Criterion 2)
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(from test trials one and three), but also by reasoning about
the category of a stimulus based solely on the context in
which it was presented and without any direct feedback (as
in test trials two and four). This requires the individual to
make an inference about the S - 1 in the absence of direct
information about this stimulus. It is this lack of direct
information that qualifies correct responses in the fourth
task as exclusion based on an inference. One might argue
that this pattern resulted from a combination of ‘one trial
learning 1’ and random choice in the final test trial.
However, considering that within individuals exhibiting
significant exclusion performance, patterns for ‘inference
by exclusion’ occurred significantly more often than the
patterns for ‘one trial learning 1’, rendering this explana-
tion unlikely. The fact that the number of sessions had no
influence on the occurrence of this response pattern leads
us to conclude that this strategy was not learned throughout
the task (see Fig. 4). Thus, eight out of fourteen kea were
able to spontaneously solve this abstract categorisation task
by inferring the contingency of a novel stimulus through
logical exclusion of the alternative.
It is interesting to note that the sequence in which the
test trials were presented did not affect the performance of
the individuals. Individuals of group A were required to
store information about the S ? 1 for longer and simulta-
neously pay attention to a novel stimulus with negative
contingency (S - 1) in order to respond correctly in all test
trials. Subjects of group B could apply the information
about these stimuli in a more direct sequential manner,
possibly implying a reduction in the cognitive load
(Sweller 1988). Nevertheless, both groups performed
equally well with respect to their exclusion skills. There-
fore, it seems that an increase in cognitive load, in terms of
working memory and parallel information storing, does not
influence exclusion skills, at least not in this test design. An
alternative explanation, as one reviewer pointed out, might
be that the relatively subtle difference in procedure simply
did sufficiently increase the cognitive load, and therefore,
no effect was detectable. In this respect, future studies may
address the effect of cognitive load more thoroughly by
increasing the number of training trials between test trials
to increase difficulty, or presenting corresponding test trials
in direct succession, to decrease the load on the working
memory.
However, the kea did not solely rely on inference skills
in this task. On an individual level, we could show that
novelty aversion, along with one trial learning, stimulus
preferences and simply avoiding the S- also guided some
individuals’ choices. Avoiding the S-, by forming a neg-
ative association with the unrewarded stimulus, may rep-
resent an efficient, low-cost strategy. Ecologically it seems
adaptive to decrease responses towards a stimulus that does
not provide any benefits (such as nutrition or information)
or might even be harmful. Several studies on exclusion
performance have discussed this alternative as a potential
confound (e.g. Aust et al. 2008; Shaw et al. 2013; Nawroth
et al. 2014), but conclusive controls remain rare (Call 2006;
O’Hara et al. 2015a).
Fig. 3 Distribution of strategies employed. Categorical strategies
relied on by individuals of each group in the test; values enclosed in
the bar graphs correspond to the adjusted probability of the amount of
sessions with certain response patterns to occur by chance; significant
values are printed in bold
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Novelty aversion somewhat contradicts the kea’s nat-
ural predisposition to explore novel objects (Diamond and
Bond 1999; Kubat 1992). One explanation for this result
may be that three individuals (Kermit, Paul and Sunny)
established a rule to avoid novel stimuli during the training
phase, as these were never rewarded during the discrimi-
nation training. One might argue that this rule could con-
tribute to the performance with respect to the inference by
exclusion patterns; however, only one individual (Sunny)
simultaneously showed significantly more occurrences of
novelty avoidance and inference by exclusion than would
be predicted by chance.
One trial learning can be considered a cognitively
demanding strategy as it requires individuals to flexibly
respond to novel stimuli based on one single feedback
event. In particular, considering that responses to novel
stimuli were (to some degree) extinguished during training
highlights this flexibility applied in test trials.
Stimulus preferences and avoidances seem to occur in
most tested subjects and pose a further low-cost strategy.
Such preferences may arise simply through shared features
with known stimuli, which are utilised by the individuals to
attribute a positive or negative valence to a test stimulus.
Overall, the large variance in strategies employed by dif-
ferent individuals in this task is indicative that cognitively
less demanding mechanisms may override more ‘costly’
ones, whenever the opportunity is provided. What exactly
the features are that provide these opportunities and when a
certain threshold for such more simplistic classifications is
passed remain subject to further research. Interestingly,
however, none of the tested individuals seemed to have
chosen purely randomly in the test trials, as would have
been indicated by no preference for any particular response
strategy.
As mentioned earlier, restriction in sample size of young
subjects precluded an analysis of the effects of age on
inference by exclusion. However, we would like to point
out that both, juvenile and sub-adult, individuals (Papu and
Paul) seem to have chosen based on perceptual cues, rather
than employing inferences or one trial learning. In pri-
mates, it has been shown that exclusion abilities increase
with age (Call 2006) suggesting that this ability may be
subject to cognitive development. Although the small
sample size of young individuals renders any conclusion
from the current experiment highly speculative, this might
open an interesting avenue for further studies, investigating
if exclusion abilities in birds are developed with age as it
appears to be the case in primates (Call 2006).
The holistic approach, allowing and considering multi-
ple possible behavioural strategies underlying choice in the
test trials, was essential to evaluate the effect of training to
avoid novel stimuli in this study. Thus, we could show
novelty aversion was not a strategy generally adopted,
although some individuals did seem to have established
this rule. Furthermore, the comparison of different strate-
gies highlights the relative prevalence of inference by
exclusion, as this appears to be the strategy that most often
reached significance levels.
Fig. 4 Individual distribution of response patterns over sessions. Each square represents colour-coded response patterns expressed by
individuals of each group for each of the thirty test sessions; individuals are ordered within their respective experimental group
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Taken together, the results indicate that kea are capable
of inferring by exclusion, which contradicts earlier findings
of Schloegl et al. (2009b). As has been hypothesised for
other species (Mikolasch et al. 2012; Shaw et al. 2013), we
assume that simpler cognitive mechanisms or predisposi-
tions (such as neophilia or stimulus enhancement) have
masked previous attempts to reveal evidence for exclusion
skills. In this respect, we would also expect the ravens,
which showed reliable exclusion performance in the study
by Schloegl et al. (2009b), to be guided by a range of
different response strategies in this approach, similar to the
kea. The fact that larger relative brain sizes are found in
food-storing species has led some researchers to suggest
that specialised feeding ecology is a driving force for brain
evolution (Krebs 1990). However, by reversing the
causality one might also assume that the evolution of large
brains in relation to body size has allowed for cognitive
abilities to emerge, which in turn provided some species
with the cognitive framework to promote food-storing
behaviour. There is growing evidence from psittacines and
corvids, all with large relative brain sizes but differing in
feeding ecology, to exhibit such inference by exclusion
skills in different set-ups, such as African grey parrots
(Psittacus erithacus, Mikolasch et al. 2011; Schloegl et al.
2012; Pepperberg et al. 2013), Clark’s nutcrackers (Nu-
cifraga columbiana, Tornick and Gibson 2013), Goffin
cockatoos (O’Hara et al. 2015a), New Caledonian crows
(Corvus moneduloides, Jelbert et al. 2015) and ravens
(Schloegl et al. 2009b). However, only inconclusive data
are available for other members of these families, e.g.
carrion crows (Corvus corone corone, Mikolasch et al.
2012), Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius, Shaw et al.
2013) and jackdaws (Corvus monedula, Schloegl 2011),
and no inference by exclusion skills could be observed so
far in the greater anis (Crotophaga major), itself not a
member of either psittacines or corvids, in respect to the
rejection of parasitic eggs (Riehl et al. 2015). This yields
the consideration of reasoning by exclusion being a more
fundamental cognitive trait, possibly coinciding with the
evolution of large brains (Pepperberg et al. 2013). The
hypothesis that it is a convergent adaption to feeding
ecology (Schloegl et al. 2009a, b; Schloegl 2011; Miko-
lasch et al. 2012) has only recently been challenged by
Shaw et al. (2013). Another compelling factor that might
have contributed to a species’ capacity to infer by exclu-
sion is the complexity of its social structure (Petit et al.
2015).
Here, we suggest a more holistic approach by consid-
ering multiple factors, such as social structure, migratory
patterns, habitat complexity as well as specialised foraging
strategies, as promoters of the evolution of advanced
cognitive abilities (Tornick and Gibson 2013) in correla-
tion with the evolution of larger brains (e.g. Harvey et al.
1980; Dunbar 1998; Reader and Laland 2002; Lefebvre
et al. 2004; Connor 2007; Sol et al. 2010). In this sense, a
mechanism would be adaptive that is capable of dealing
with problems that require the same computation, but can
be applied in different contexts. Hence, challenges in the
physical and social domain may have selected for greater
neuronal correlates that allowed establishing advanced
cognitive capacities when confronted with similar prob-
lems in multiple domains.
The evidence of inference by exclusion in small-brained
birds is far from compelling. There is some evidence for
this ability in domestic chickens (Gallus domesticus,
Hogue et al. 1996), graylag geese (Anser anser, Weiß et al.
2010), as well as pigeons (Columba livia, Wynne 1997).
Pigeons could be ‘encouraged’ to select novel stimuli over
defined ones, hence choosing by exclusion (Clement and
Zentall 2003). However, this study could not show, given
the applied set-up, whether pigeons would also be able to
learn from this experience to infer unknown stimulus
contingencies based on exclusion. The pigeon’s sensitivity
to the testing protocol was demonstrated in a study by Aust
et al. (2008) that applied the same (touch screen) procedure
to several species comparatively. While some dogs and
nearly all human participants showed evidence for learning
by exclusion, all pigeon subjects failed.
The need for standardised testing protocols involving
rigorous controls for alternative strategies has also been
demonstrated in mammals. Dwarf goats (Capra aegagrus
hircus) but not sheep (Ovis orientalis aries) performed above
chance levels (Nawroth et al. (2014). However, the
researchers could not exclude that individuals had acquired
the simple strategy of avoiding the empty cup. Themethod of
testing multiple concurrent strategies as presented here has
already been successfully employed with Goffin cockatoos
(Cacatua goffini) showing surprisingly similar response
strategies (O’Hara et al. 2015a). We therefore suggest that
the abstract categorisation task, a modified training proce-
dure to discourage explorative behaviour before the test, and
the specific sequence of tailored tests provide a suit-
able paradigm for inter-species comparisons of inference by
exclusion abilities and competing response strategies. In
general, we suggest shifting the focus from binary-outcome-
driven tasks towards investigating category decisions and
choice behaviour in a more holistic manner.
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